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BOOK REVIEW

The Common Law As Cricket
By Patrick S. Atiyah*
and Robert S. Summers.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Pp. xx, 437. $69.00.
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW.

Reviewed by David F. Partlettt
I.

INTRODUCTION

Cricket and baseball are the summer national pastimes of England
and America. They both involve players, one of whom propels a hard
leather ball toward another with the intent of getting that other "out."
The hitter tries to avoid getting out and attempts to hit the ball as far
as possible. Umpires preside. Despite all these and other common factors, the games are different. Baseball is brash and dusty, and umpires
endure frequent abuse; cricket is restrained and village greenish, and
umpires rarely suffer abuse. Both games draw from history and culture.
Where transplanted the games assume a different guise. In the West
Indies a Caribbean passion possesses cricket. In Central America a
Latin bravado inspires baseball.
Much the same can be said of the common law. To the American,
cricket and English law seem confined and stodgy. Baseball and American law to the Englishman seem overwrought and brazen. A book to
bridge our knowledge gap in sports has not been written. Fortunately,
however, Professors Patrick S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers have
written a book that should cure us of our legal ignorance and do much
* Professor of English Law Emeritus, Oxford University. B.C.L., 1954, M.A., 1957, D.C.L.,
1974, Oxford University.
** McRoberts Research Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.S., 1955, University of Oregon; LL.B., 1959, Harvard University.
t Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. LL.B., 1971, University of Sydney; LL.M., 1974,
University of Michigan; S.J.D., 1980, University of Virginia. I am grateful to Eric A. Szweda for his
diligent research assistance.
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to lead us to a deeper understanding of the common law.1
The common law is our heritage but the way it is employed differs
in each country. English courts would not dare, as their American cousins have, judicially to create strict liability for defective products or to
replace the defense of contributory negligence with comparative fault.2
These tasks are legislative. The role of the courts and their relationship
with other lawmaking organs differ distinctly. This difference is a product of history, political philosophy, and culture.
Professors Atiyah and Summers in Form and Substance in AngloAmerican Law masterfully describe the differences in English and
American law. But this work is no blind taxonomy of differences; their
description is designed to validate a theory of the law. In this book
comparative law informs legal theory. It is a significant contribution to
modern jurisprudence.
The state of American law accentuates the timeliness of this contribution. American law is engaged in a frenzy of theoretical navel gazing.
The integrity or inner cohesion of the law has been assailed.3 Although
by no means new, the recent attack has a new virulence. At its broadest
4
this attack states that the law is but varnished power: it is politics.

Form and Substance allows a wider focus. The American debate
may be placed in a broader context-a context which may reveal that
the law is autonomous, a separate normative system. The theoretical
paradigm employed by Professors Atiyah and Summers reinforces an
important movement in the theoretical debate. Formalism in the law
often has been derided as an empty or foolish notion: something that
Charles Dickens demolished in Bleak House.' But it now is being taken
seriously again. Form and Substance will enhance the case of those who
argue for formalism. The idea of formalism, although presented in elegant detail in the book, deserves a separate treatment. The evolutionary
aspect of the legal theory may cut asunder the paradigms of substantiveness and formalism that are proposed as ideal types of the American and English law.6 It may be that American law is in a process,
ter

1. P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1989) [hereinafFORM AND SUBSTANCE].
2. See infra note 97.
3. See Posner, The Decline of Law As an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100

HARV.

L.

REV. 761, 766-77 (1987).

4. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976). See generally R.

UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT

(1986); Posner, supra

note 3, at 765 (stating that "the American intellectual scene in the late 1950s and early 1960s was
remarkably free from ideological strife" and in this "period it was natural to think of law not in
political but in technical terms"); CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
5.

C.

DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE

(1853).

6. See Tonnies' Use of Ideal Types of Gameinschaft and Gesellschaft, in LAW AND
THE CRISIS IN LEGAL IDEAS 52 (E. Kamenka, R. Brown & A. Erh-Soon Tay eds. 1978).
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under the influence of theorists and pragmatic reformers, of embracing
formalism anew. Form and Substance will play a part in that reappraisal of formalism. Professors Atiyah and Summers succeed in an
avowed purpose "to rehabilitate formal legal reasoning." '7 The authors
pursue their mission because they are "convinced that formal reasons
are central to law, and that their proper analysis is one of the most
neglected topics in the history of modern legal theory."8 Paradoxically,
English and Commonwealth law may well be in a process, influenced by
earlier American law and the felt need to protect the citizen against the
state, of casting off formalism in favour of substance.
This process carries into an oversight of Form and Substance. The
authors' treatment of American and English law and theory tends to
underrate the growing influence of American law. While English law has
been relatively impervious to American influence, forces are at work
that will make American law more relevant. Even more interesting is
other Commonwealth law, especially the law of those nations with federal constitutions like Australia and Canada, where constitutional habits promote a search for wider principles."0
One last point becomes lost in the book's detail. Although Professors Atiyah and Summers probably would say it is implicit, they should
have stated explicitly that a large gulf separates American and Commonwealth common law in their respective sources for inspiration and
growth. American common law is extremely eclectic. Ideas are welcomed from many quarters. The views of the legal academy are especially potent, particularly those of the faculty in the elite law schools."
The institutions of the law schools, the use of judicial clerks,' the lack
of a specialized bar, the legislative committee systems, and the play of
interest groups encourage the rapid transmission of fresh ideas to the
supra note 1, at 7.

7.

FORM AND SUBSTANCE,

8.
9.

Id.
See infra notes 19-40 and accompanying text.

10. See B. STRAYER, THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS: THE FUNCTION AND SCOPE
(2d ed. 1983); see also G. BEAUDOIN & E. RATUSHNY, THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

A COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1989); Bakan, Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation and Legitimacy in Canadian Constitutional Thought, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 123 (1989).
For influence of protections on the New Zealand law, see Richardson, Judges as Lawmakers in the
1990s, 12 MONASH L REV. 35, 38 (1986) (the New Zealand Court of Appeal judge notes that New
Zealand is considering such protections and that this activity will "involve the courts in making
value judgments with considerable consequences"); see also Gibbs, Eleventh Wilfred FullagarMemorial Lecture: The Constitutional Protectionof Human Rights, 9 MONASH L. REV. 1 (1982).
11. See White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014, 2032
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS:

(1989) (reviewing R,

POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE:

A

MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION

(1988)).

12. For a discussion of the role of law clerks by the authors, see FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra
note 1, at 281-83.
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courts and other legal decision makers."3 With Paul Johnson some may
say that intellectuals are villains, 1 4 while others may relish the rich
marketplace of ideas. Whatever one's view, ideas are in the air. They
are debated strenuously. The realists have come and gone but find a
second life in the critical legal studies movement. 15 Although flourishing, the law and economics theorists are attacked vociferously. Law and
literature becomes an area promoted to give a new perspective to the
law. 16 In contrast, English and Commonwealth law is established to filter ideas generated by legal academia. The common law-the way it is
fashioned-appears as curmudgeonly pragmatic; philosophical pretenses are eschewed.'1 Ideas are generated within the close ranks of the
bench and the bar or within the professional ranks of the civil service
and the politicians. 8
Because of the growing influence of American law, the ideas deriving from American legal academics adopted by American courts are
transformed into a recognized discourse for consumption by Commonwealth courts. Accordingly, the ideas of American academics may influence Commonwealth law more strongly than the writings of indigenous
legal academics. Rounding out the circle, if formalism reclaims theoretical ground it may be expected that it will be internalized within American law through the influence of American legal scholarship.
This Review's thesis is that the common law increasingly will crossfertilize. While the paradigm of formal and substantive reasoning proposed by Professors Atiyah and Summers is useful for their exposition,
its factual basis may be eroding as ideas are absorbed into American
and Commonwealth law at different rates. It is a true explication of the
past but inaccurate for the future. It does not follow, however, that a
grand unification is proceeding. Far from it. English society and culture
are much different from their American counterparts. Commonwealth
countries are different again. I claim simply that the paradigms will
weaken. The counter examples cited by the authors likely will multiply.
The penetration of American law will be discussed in Part II. In
Part III the nature of formalism and how Form and Substance deepens
our understanding of it will be explored. These two sections, along with
13. Clark, The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1266 (1981).
14. P. JOHNSON, INTELLECTUALS (1988).
15. See White, The Inevitability of CriticalLegal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 649 (1984).
16. See White, supra note 11, at 2014; Law, Literature,and Social Change, 43 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming Nov. 1990).
17. See National Ins. Co. of N.Z. Ltd. v. Espagne, 105 C.L.R. 569, 590 (Austl. 1961)
(Windeyer, J.) (quoting Sir Frederick Pollock who sounded the warning that "the lawyer cannot
afford to adventure himself with philosophers in the logical and metaphysical controversies that
beset the idea of cause").
18. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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Parts IV, V, and VI, which convey my observations about the reception
of the ideas in the process of law formation, indicate that evolution may
erode the factual basis of the ideal types employed by Professors Atiyah
and Summers.
II. THE PENETRATION OF AMERICAN LAW
It is wrong to say that American law has wielded little influence on
the minds of the English and Commonwealth lawmakers. Justice O.W.
Holmes and Professor Frederick Pollock discussed the universals of the
common law, something in keeping with the notion that the principles
of law were scientifically rational and could be derived from root principles.1 9 Historically, of course, it was English law after the hiatus of the
American Revolution, that powerfully shaped American law.
Especially after the turn of the century, examples are found in the
common law of American law being a catalyst for change. In the famous
Donoghue v. Stevenson decision, 0 the House of Lords imposed negligence liability on a manufacturer of products to remote parties, thereby
establishing negligence as a separate tort. The House of Lords found
that the manufacturer of ginger beer owed a duty to the ultimate consumer who alleged that she was injured when a decomposed snail
emerged from her bottle. Lord Atkin drew upon Justice Benjamin Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.21 Underscoring the MacPherson influences, Justice Evatt of the Australian High
Court wrote to Lord Atkin in 1933 in the following terms:
The Snail Case has been the subject of the keenest interest and debate at the Bar
and in the Sydney and Melbourne Law Schools: on all sides there is profound satisfaction that, in substance, your judgment and the opinion of Justice Cardozo of the
U.S.A. coincide, and that the common law is again shown to be capable of meeting
modern conditions 2of industrialization, and of striking through forms of legal separateness to reality.

In a direct fashion the United States Constitution was the model
for the Australian Constitution upon Australian federation in 1900.
Consistent with Professors Atiyah and Summers' thesis the Australians
eschewed incorporation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.2 3 Moreover, the style of judicial interpretation of the Australian Constitution
19. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF
(2d ed. 1879); see also Posner, supra note 3, at 762. See generally
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS (M. Howe ed. 1961) (reporting their discussion of the scientifical nature of legal rules).
20. 1932 App. Cas. 562.
21. Id. at 598 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
22. G. LEWIS, LORD ATKIN 67 (1983) (quoting Letter from Mr. Justice Evatt, High Ct. of
Australia, to Lord Atkin (Mar. 1933)).
23. See J. LANAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION (1972).
CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
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was more markedly "legalistic" or formal. Australia's greatest High
Court Justice, Sir Owen Dixon, was proud of his court's "legalistic"

style. 24
The influence of America became more palpable after the Second
World War, especially in the Commonwealth. Many of the presuppositions of British protection were shattered in that war. For example,
Australia's foreign policy was aligned with the United States. The law
lagged behind political changes, but changes were afoot. Law graduates
with outstanding credentials who formerly went to Oxford or Cambridge for postgraduate studies, began attending elite American schools.
The excitement and intellectual intensity of American law seized these
graduates. Those who returned and taught law were to influence generations of students. Especially influential was Professor Julius Stone at
the University of Sydney Law School-a jurisprudent and international
lawyer-who previously served on the Harvard faculty. The realists' insights and the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound were expounded upon, if not always fully appreciated by students.2 5
For all this activity, the law remained firmly hierarchical and formal. The apex of the hierarchy was the Privy Council in London. It is
accurate to say there was a uniform common law, tailored somewhat to
the conditions of the particular Commonwealth country. The Privy
Council principally was composed of Law Lords who usually sat on the
House of Lords. Although House of Lords decisions were not binding,
26
the overlapping personnel obviously cleaved to uniformity.
These ties became increasingly anomalous, and after much legal
jockeying between the States of Australia and the federal government
all appeals to the Privy Council were abolished. The Australian High
Court became the final court of appeal. The Australia Act in 1986 effectively created a new grund norm for Australia.2 7 The English law be24. See 0. DIXON, JESTING PILATE (1965); Mason, The Role of a ConstitutionalCourt in Federation: A Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience, 16 FED. L. REV. 1, 4
(1986).
25. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 355-68 (1961); J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW & JUSTICE (1966).
26. In a number of cases the High Court of Australia ameliorated the harsh consequences of
the common-law rule that a trespasser was owed no duty of care. See Commissioner for Rys. v.
Cardy, 104 C.L.R. 274 (Austl. 1960); Rich v. Commissioner for Rys., 101 C.L.R. 135 (Austl. 1959).
But this holding was repudiated by the Privy Council in Commissioner for Rys. v. Quinlan, 1964
App. Cas. 1054 (P.C.). The Quinlan decision was much criticized, the legitimacy of which was
confirmed when the House of Lords adopted a new approach in Herrington v. British Rys. Bd.,
1972 App. Cas. 877. This decision left the Commonwealth law ruled by an acknowledged unsatisfactory decision, a situation cured only when the Privy Council decided Southern Portland Cement
v. Cooper, 1974 App. Cas. 623 (P.C.). Eventually the law reverted to a test similar to that enunciated in Rich and Cardy.
27. The Australia Act, 1986, ch. 2, reflects the positivist vision of the law suggested by the
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came less compelling. Australian judges accordingly were faced more
urgently and directly than in the past with the need to create a body of
law suitable to the needs of the country.28
American models were referred to in the legislative sphere. This
reference was especially the case when American society already had
faced issues that were newly emerging in the Commonwealth. The 1974
Trade Practices Act adopted many of the American antitrust concepts.
In securities regulation the American regulatory model inspired the enactment of Commonwealth legislation establishing the National Companies and Securities Commission to perform some of the same functions
as the Securities and Exchange Commission. When ethnic and racial
diversity loomed as social issues the American record was examined for
lessons.2 9
The growing influence of American law occurred at the same time
that elements of English law were appearing to be more alien to Commonwealth eyes. In 1972 the United Kingdom entered the European
Economic Community and undertook to bring its laws into conformity
with those prevailing under European guidelines.3 0 For example, English company law was brought within those guidelines. 31 Importantly for
the erosion of formalism, adherence to the European Convention on
Human Rights injected concepts into English legal discourse that
clashed with accepted common-law standards and constitutional
conventions.3 2
These influences have fractured the common law. Australian, New
authors.
28. The Council of the Shire of Sutherland v. Heyman, 60 A.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1985) (establishing liability rules distinct from English rules covering the same topic).
29. See, e.g., Evans, New Directions in Australian Race Relations Law, 48 AUSTL. L.J. 479,
481 (1974) (noting that Australian racial discrimination laws in part were patterned after United
States equal protection laws).
30. See The Siskina, [1977] 3 All E.R. 803, 829-930; European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68,
§ 2.
31. See Schmitthoff, The UK Companies Legislation of 1985, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 673,
674-75 (1985). The causes of the 1985 consolidation of UK company law were thus external, i.e.
EEC law, and internal. It should be added that the effect of the EEC Directives relating to company law on English law has been very beneficial. First, it helped to modernize English company
law and secondly it completed the UK legislator and act within the time limits stated in the Directives. Company law often has been the Cinderella of UK legislation, as is evident from the failure
to implement the recommendations of the Jenkins Report of 1962 after it was published. It is no
exaggeration to state that but for the need to implement the EEC Directive there would have been
little effective reform of companies legislation in the UK during the last decades. Id. at 676; see
also Consumer Protection Act, 1987, ch. 43 (implementing European Community Directive (85/
374-EEC)); Cardwell, The Consumer Protection Act 1987: Enforcement of Provisions Governing
the Safety of Consumer Goods, 50 MOD. L. REv. 622 (1987).
32. See A.M. & S. Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the European Community, [1983] 3 W.L.R.
17, discussed in Partlett, Attorney-Client Privilege, Professions and the Common Law Tradition,
10 J. LEG. PROF. 9, 15 (1985).
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Zealand, and Canadian law likely will drift from the English and from
one another. No doubt there are costs in this drift. The accumulated
wisdom of the English courts in commercial disputes is not as directly
available. Lack of scale will oblige these independent systems to search
for that wisdom in comparative experiences, the relevance of which
must be established. American law accordingly provides a ready made
common-law and legislative laboratory because of its scale and respontransportasiveness to problems. The risks, however, of inappropriate
33
present.
are
understanding
tion due to a want of
One last phenomenon may help establish conditions whereby Commonwealth lawmakers will be more comfortable with American law. A
considerable number of English and other Commonwealth legal academics recently have visited American law schools. Professor Atiyah is
an outstanding example. He had regular sojourns, inter alia, at Cornell,
Duke, and Virginia. Amongst others, Professor Paul Craig of Worcester
College, Oxford, has visited at Virginia and Cornell. Craig's American
experience has been translated to his impressive writing in the administrative and torts areas.34 Professor Gareth Jones from Cambridge is a
frequent visitor at Chicago. On a permanent basis Professor John Fleming joined the Boalt Hall faculty in 1960 after deaning at the Australian
National University and establishing an international reputation as a
torts scholar from that base. Fleming's outstanding torts book, The
Law of Torts, incorporates many American ideas and continues to influence generations of Australian and Commonwealth lawyers and law students.3 5 Professor Norval Morris, a former dean at Chicago, has been
influential in criminal law and criminology. Morris, an Australian, began her academic career at the University of Adelaide. A recent transplant is Professor A.W.B. Simpson, one of the preeminent English legal
historians, who has joined the University of Michigan Law School."
This migratory trend has been reciprocated. Perhaps the towering figure of this list is Professor Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin, an American,
carried with him an American version of the law37 when he took his
33. See Dror, Law and Social Change, 33 TUL. L. REV. 787, 802 (1959) (stating that "[t]he
high rate of social change prevalent or aimed at in nearly all contemporary societies seriously challenges the skills and abilities of statesmen, lawyers and social scientists"); Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW. Q. REV. 79 (1976).
34. See CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1989); Craig, Negligent Misstatements, Negligent Acts and Economic Loss, 92 LAW Q. REV. 213 (1976).
35. See J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS (7th ed. 1987).
36. See A. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY; ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW (1987);
A. SIMPSON, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT (1978).
37. Dworkin's vision is court centered turning on hard cases. Hart and the English positivists
focused upon the central core of legal norms. See Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399
(1985). The Australian and Victorian Law Reform Commission's joint Product Liability Report
was tabled in the Australian Parliament on August 15, 1989. THE LAW REFORM COMM'N OF AUSTRA-
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chair at Oxford, the heartland of English positivism. 8
Closely related to this recent phenomenon of Commonwealth legal
scholars visiting American law schools, reciprocal faculty exchanges
provide another source for the injection of American legal doctrine. For
example, Vanderbilt and Leeds have exchanged faculty. The University
of Florida has a flourishing program with Monash University in
Melbourne.
It would be possible to catalogue more. Suffice it to say that today
there is an extraordinary interchange between lawyers of all stripes in
the common-law world. The Australian Law Reform Commission, in its
reference on liability for defective products, had its Commissioner in
charge, Professor Jack Goldring, travel to the United States to learn
firsthand of the American experience. In the reform of defamation law,
the American experience under the first amendment and New York
Times v. Sullivan 9 has been noted.4 0 To reiterate, this interchange and
the fracturing of the common law likely will infuse American legal doctrines and ideas into the body of Commonwealth law.
For all this exchange, Professors Atiyah and Summers' divide between formal and substantive paradigms holds. I wish to indicate
merely that a condition for change is in place. Another condition, a
transplantation in American legal conceptions from substantive to formal legal norms, is my next topic in showing the dynamics at work that
may undermine the paradigm. Ironically, Form and Substance will be a
catalyst for this change. This work will promote mutual understanding
of the respective systems and afford more sensitive interchange, productive transplantation, and informed practical and theoretical
dialogue.
III. FORMALISM
My elaboration on the formal/substantive paradigm begins with an
attempt to explain the paradigm to demonstrate the power of the argument. Then I shall turn to show that formal legal norms are an idea
whose time has come in the American context.
Professors Atiyah and Summers set forth succinctly but in illumiLIA REPORT No. 51 AND THE LAW REFORM COMM'N OF VICTORIA REPORT

No. 47, PRODUCT LIABILITY
(1989). It recommends a novel compensation based model rather than the product safety model
that is the base of the American law. For a description, see The Reform of ProductLiability Law:
Proposals by the Australian and Victorian Law Reform Commissions, 63 AusTL. L.J. 723 (1989).
38. Professor Dworkin's scholarship is overwhelming, but two representative works are R
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1963).
40. See Unfair Publication Defamation and Privacy, A.L.R.C 11 app. F (1978) (discussing
the impact of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963)). The Law Reform Commission did
not accept the sweeping change that this proposal would have ushered into Australian law.
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nating detail the differences and similarities of American and English
law. They attempt the daunting task of analyzing the background of
those differences and similarities. In so doing they pinpoint the different jurisprudential traditions and how those traditions have been both
influential in, and molded by, the institutions of our law-the courts,
the judges, the legal profession, and the law schools-all of which derive
from our respective cultures and history.
To explicate these distinctions the authors rest upon the formal/
substantive paradigm. They suggest that a different vision of the law
prevails in the two countries they examine. The English vision is more
formal; the American is more substantive. In terms expressed by the
authors this distinction in vision is between the law "as a system of
rules" and the law as "an outward expression of the community's sense
of right or justice.

'41

Other scholars intuitively have arrived at similar conclusions, but
to the time this work was published no one had done it as stringently
and comprehensively as Professors Atiyah and Summers.42 No other
book has had the benefit of joint creation by doyens of jurisprudence in
their respective countries. At bottom the authors contend that the difference between the English and American visions is traceable to the
idea of the role of law in society; theory molds the substance and institutions of our law. Professors Atiyah and Summers assert a "strong correlation between the degree of formality in the two systems and the
degree to which lawyers and theorists in those systems adhere to more,
' 43
or less, formal theories of law."

One of the challenges of Form and Substance is that its theoretical
premise must be mastered before a full appreciation of its detail can be
vouchsafed. A casual reading will leave one befuddled. Although one
could read in isolation the book's law school chapter with interest, it
would be much less satisfying and a little puzzling. Therefore, let me
set forth the crux of the thesis.
The authors identify four different kinds of formality in legal reasoning. The first is authoritative formality. 44 In terms of legal standards, some principles are high on the formality scale, for example a
duly enacted statutory standard. At the other end of the spectrum is a
41.

FORM

AND SUBSTANCE,

supra note 1, at 5.

42. For an excellent comparison of English and American judges, see L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN JUDGES As LAWMAKERS (1969).
43. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 35. In another context J.S. Mill saw the English
inclination toward rules and hence formality: "England is the country in which social discipline
has most succeeded, not so much in conquering, as in suppressing whatever is most liable to conflict with it. The English, more than any other people, not only act but feel according to rule." J.
MILL, SUBJECTATION OF WOMEN III (1869).
44. Id. at 12.
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judicially invoked moral principle, which will have little formal authority. This principle lies just within the boundary of legal standards. The
degree of formality supporting a legal principle largely determines the
conclusiveness of the standard in the sense of whether it can be questioned or put against competing standards-the greater its formal au45
thority the greater its authoritativeness.
Authoritative formality is a function of what Professors Atiyah and
Summers term "rank formality." All formal reasons are ruled by priorities. A constitutional provision displaces a conflicting statute, and a
statute displaces a contrary contract."
The rule itself may exhibit varying degrees of formality. This type
is dubbed "content formality." Some rules announce blunt standards,
such as "keep to the left." These may be arbitrary in the sense they are
under- and over-inclusive. Some rules within their terms introduce leeways for substantive judgment, for example by imposing a reasonableness standard.47
Reflecting the current interest in statutes, the authors identify interpretative formality. Methods of statutory interpretation may be
more or less formal. The interpretation is highly formal if it seizes upon
the literal meanings of words. To the extent that broad underlying intentions are invoked the method is less formal." Although interpretative formality mainly applies to the interpretation of statutes, it has
some application to case law.4 9
45. Id. This formalism is not reserved to legal rules; it is well known in the oft heard parental
refrain "because I told you so!" It serves the purpose that the authors identify-it puts an end to
dispute. That is, unless the child is a natural crit, as I fear many are.
46. The statute may have a strong judicial gloss attached to it. For a displacing example, see
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (interpreting
a statute to classify a contract as affecting the public interest overriding contractual waiver of
liability).
47. For a comprehensive discussion of leeways of choice in the common-law method, see J.
STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW: DYNAMICS OF COMMON LAW GROWTH 123-39 (1985).
48. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
49. Such is the habit of mind of some English courts that common-law perceptions are interpreted on occasion in painstaking and literalistic fashion. For example, Lord Wilberforce, in Anns
v. Merton London Borough Council, 1978 App. Cas. 728 uttered the dictum:
[T]he position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a
particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of
previous situations in which a duty has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and
the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or
neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his
part may be likely to cause damage to the latter-in which case a prima facie duty of care
arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider
whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope
of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it
may give rise: see Dorset Yacht case [1970] App. Cas. 1004, per Lord Reid at p. 1027.
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A last category measures the mandatory quality of the formality.
This category recognizes that legal rules must be applied. Mandatory
formality at the point of application will exclude competing considerations. An example of a rule with high mandatory formality is a statute
of limitations.5 0
Different systems will exhibit different mixes of formality. Every
legal system must be formal to some extent. Reasons for those various
degrees of reliance upon formality rest upon a second level of justification 5 1-a level that depends heavily upon general substantive considerations. Many would call it policy or public policy. 2 The formality of
first level rules commonly can be justified by reference to those substantive or policy considerations. 3 A formal rule may provide certainty.
For example, a concrete property rule will promote efficiency.5 4 The
rule of law depends upon the existence of rules whereby relations between individuals, corporations, and government may be ordered. 5
Beyond this obvious justification for formal reasons, Professors
Atiyah and Summers present several more functional and pragmatic
justifications. The first and foremost pragmatic reason arises out of the
necessities of decision making.56 The authors state that making decisions that have some finality is one of the principal purposes of a legal
system. 57 Without formal rules all reasons would be in play all of the
time. Rules are necessary to limit, order, and defer institutionally.
In a supplementary way formal rules reduce costs and diminish the
risk of errors. Formal rules reinforce our value choices of the appropriate person or institution to make decisions. They put an end to dispute
and promote certainty and predictability.
We often are given in our discussion of formalism to attach prejorative labels to it. Those who condemn reasoning not alive to its policy
implications call the reasoning formalistic. Professors Atiyah and SumId. at 751-52. This dictum was interpreted as a rule, which by invocation would establish a duty of
care. See Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553 (C.A.). However, this statute-like
implication was repudiated in Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson
& Co., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 953, 960 (H.L.) (per Lord Keith), and in Leigh and Sillivan v. Aliakmon
Shipping Co., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 289, 305 (C.A.) (Oliver, L.J.). Lord Wilberforce's dictum is redolent
of that in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 7428, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
50. See infra note 140.
51. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 21.
52.

See J. BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS (1983).

FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 23.
Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972).
55. G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES (1985); G. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986); see Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1989).
56. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 24.
57. Id. at 24.
53.
54.
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mers distinguish between formal and formalistic reasoning, on the one
hand, and substantive and "substantivistic" reasoning, on the other.
Formal and substantive are neutral terms: they describe without judging. Formalistic and substantivistic are terms that describe inappropriate reasoning, "according to the criteria properly employed by the legal
system in question."58 Although likely, formal reasoning may not always
exhibit formalistic reasoning, and substantive reasoning may not always
exhibit substantivistic reasoning. This distinction made, it is possible,
in neutral terms, for the authors to state their thesis: "the English approach to law is more formal and the American more substantive."5
This thesis does not imply a value judgment, although the accumulation of evidence marshalled and their appraisal of it inclines to the view
that greater formality in the American law may be welcomed.
The remainder of the book is an elaboration of that theme. Laws
may clash, in the United States more often than in England.6 0 The resolution of the clash is resolved more often substantively in American
law. In England "formal rules of hierarchical priority" are employed
more frequently.6 1 Rules have become a subject of close jurisprudential
study.2 The authors attempt to show that in the English system the
rules tend to have higher content, interpretative, and mandatory
63

formality.

Attuned to shifting legal interests, the authors examined the paradigm with respect to statute law. 4 English law is more heavily statute
law, and the interpretation of that field of law is more formal. Indeed,
most Commonwealth lawyers are surprised by the freewheeling statutory interpretation employed by American courts. The hold of stare de67
cisis,65 variance in trial process, 66 and attitude to judicial enforcement

are examined and found to fit within the paradigm.
With such a comprehensive description, the authors address why
58. Id. at 31 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id. at 32.
60. See Posner, supra note 3, at 770 (stating that the replacement of mechanical rules (such
as the rule of lex loci delicti) by "interest analysis" and its many variants has resulted in the
destruction of certainty in the field of Conflict of Laws, especially in accident cases). In accordance
with the thesis of this Review the High Court of Australia in Breavington v. Godleman, 62 A.L.J.R.
447 (Austl. 1988), draws heavily upon American conflicts jurisprudence in avoiding the applicability of the lex loci delicti within a federal state with a full faith and credit clause. Mason, C.J., did
not find the Canadian experience to be as instructive. Id. at 450.
61. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 42-69.
62. See G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, supra note 55.
63. Id. at 70-95.
64. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 96-112.
65. Id. at 115-56.
66. Id. at 157-85.
67. Id. at 182-221.
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this paradigm should be the case. The reasons are theoretical, cultural,
historical, and institutional. This concept is not a strong theory of causation, but rather a supported correlation. These themes are fleshed out
in the remaining chapters. A broad sweep of the different legal theory
legacies are given. Comparisons in the institutions of the courts, legislatures, judges, the legal profession, and legal education are seen to operate in ways that bear out the paradigm.
In the structure of these institutions a theme identified in Chapter
one is a most important insight. In my view it deserves more prominence than accorded to it by Professors Atiyah and Summers. Institutions of the law are part of governmental structure. They reflect the
degrees to which parts of government distrust each other. American
judges, the authors say, do not trust American police to balance properly, whereas English judges have faith in police integrity.68 Indeed,
English judges tend to trust the "legal-political 'establishment' "69 -governments, legislatures, officials, and police. They distrust
grassroots popularism, hence the truncated power of the jury.
The American presumption is to diffuse power because of the dangers of its concentration. Conflicting centers of power, with attendant
inefficiencies, are a price paid for avoidance of tyranny. 70 In contrast,
the crucible of English conceptions (and of the Commonwealth) can be
traced to the nineteenth century and to Jeremy Bentham. 71 Faith in
government is a centerpiece for the English. Statutes are the most efficient way of promulgating rules that should govern English society."
No checking and balancing should inhibit this function.
68. Id. at 39.
69. Id.

70. This belief is the basic tenet of the American constitutional scheme of division of powers
between the three branches of the government.

71. See J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (C. Ogden ed. 1931).
72. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 241; J. BENTHAM, supra note 71. On the American
scene, however, statutes were not traditionally favored in the legal community. See Atiyah, The
Legacy of Homes Through English Eyes, 63 B.U.L. REV. 341, 350 (1983) (tracing to Holmes the
suspicion that legislation is likely to do more harm than good); Gerber, The Reinterpretation of
the Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Age of Industrialization,in AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, ECONOMIC EXPANSION, AND THE LAW 144 (J. Frese & J. Judd eds. 1981). Gerber
noted:
The concept that the common law, as the product of the reasoning of centuries, embodied
what Roscoe Pound called "the universal jural order" made lawyers and judges suspicious of
legislations. Any statute which touched any private action must prima facie derogate the common law, and it was a common rule of statutory construction that "statutes in derogation of
the Common Law are to be construed strictly." Statutes meddled with eternal common law
notions; they innovated; they interfered with the social and legal norms. Hence, as the common law became applied and systematized in American practice, certainly throughout the
nineteenth century, it gave sustenance to the advocate of vested rights by undermining legislative enactments in favor of judge-made law.
Id. at 152-53.
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The authors are less comfortable in categorizing American law.7 3
The American system is complex in comparison to the relatively simple
English scheme. In the American legal scheme one can find formality
for every example of substantive reasoning. This complexity is caused
by the diversity of American society. Majorities need to be restrained to
protect minorities. States' interests must hold against centralized
power. The imperatives of national markets are balanced against regionalism and a state's narrow programs. 74 Constitutional issues penetrate every corner of the law and the states must yield to broad
5
interests.

7

Only the brave outsider ventures into this Serbonian bog. Professors Atiyah and Summers do so most adroitly. They avoid the exaggerated example that comparativists have used to caricature the American
or the English law. The authors are prepared to point to weaknesses in
their argument and assiduously avoid claiming too much. Such candor
is admirable, although the edge of the thesis consequently is blunted. 6
IV.

THE RISE OF FORMALISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The rise of formalism is linked to the decline of faith in substantive
reasoning. The United States Constitution is a powerful inducement for
courts to engage in substantive reasoning. The Supreme Court and the
Constitution were central in social change that came with the New
Deal, and later, the Civil Rights movement. The Court played an instrumental role in governance. Obviously with its power of judicial review this role was present, but the issue was how active the Court
7
7
would be in asserting it.

I recall reading Professor Herbert Wechsler's article, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw,7 8 as a graduate student studying

American constitutional law for the first time. Equipped only with my
knowledge of Australian constitutional law, it seemed to me that Professor Wechsler stated the obvious. I considered the article quite reasonable; it described the way that the Australian High Court went
about its interpretation of the Australian Constitution. I soon realized,
73. See FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 245-49.
74. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality
of Indiana's statute regulating takeovers).
75. Stemming from Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954), and the 1964 Civil Rights
legislation, racial equality became a dominant federal imperative.
76. For an example of rule-based law and positivist notions in American law, see FORM AND
SUBSTANCE, supra note 1, at 261. It is commonplace to observe judges pleading deference to the
legislature in admonishing those who would opt for court directed change.
77. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
78. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959).
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however, the United States Supreme Court was at the vanguard of social change; little room for formalism or "neutral principles" was allowed. The lions were Justices Earl Warren, Hugo Black, and William
Douglas, but I recall feeling more comfortable with Justice John
Harlan's opinions.79
It always can be said that constitutional law inevitably cuts to second-level substantive reasons because it is so intricately connected with
the governance of a changing society.80 Constitutional law is not politics, but it has a great impact on politics. This impact is why we worry
about its legitimacy in trumping decisions of the majority. We know,
however, that limits exist to judicial exercise of power. The court carries
institutional capital that it is ill-advised to expend on political issues.
Perhaps the abortion issue is the most germane example. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services"1 can be read as a decision that attempts
to shore up the integrity of the Court against the corrosive doctrine of
Roe v. Wade,8 2 the substantive reasoning of which ineluctably embroiled the Court in political debate.83 Even the United States Supreme
Court may reach limits when the costs of a hotly contested political
matter erode its institutional authority. More representative of the differences between American and Commonwealth law, however, is the
common law.
In the common-law sphere the prime example of the victory of substantive reasoning is in the law of torts. It was the formalism of the
turn of the century that led Professor Karl Llewellyn to describe the
era as the "least happy days of our legal system.

law.8

'8 4

That realist view

resonated strongly in tort
Under the constant urging of some academic scholars, the courts turned the law of negligence into a strong
remedial engine. 8 The formal rules of negligence either were distin79. See Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 740 (1987). I am in
good company in my Harlan feelings. Justice John Harlan's judicial philosophy is stated eloquently in an extrajudicial speech entitled "Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance." Address by Justice John M. Harlan Delivered at American Bar Center, Chicago,
Ill. (Aug. 13, 1963), reprinted in part in THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 289-92 (D.
Shapiro ed. 1969).
80. This reason partially explains, as we shall observe, the burgeoning of substantive reasoning in England and the Commonwealth.
81. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. No doubt the school busing decisions had the same effect, but racial discrimination may
be a unique category in which the court is the only institution possessing the integrity to deal with
the issue. Even in this category of racial discrimination too wide a use of judicial power will erode
the institutional capital of the court, as in the controversy over affirmative action.
84. See R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 137 (1982).
85. Id.
86. See Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, 37 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL.
Sci. 18 (1988) (discussing the litigation myth).
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guished or distorted when they frustrated the policy of imposing liability on enterprises that through their activities caused injuries. The
function of the law should be to spread losses by transferring the loss to
a deep pocket, and to compensate the inevitable class of persons who
are injured in social intercourse. This practice was instrumentalism at
its strongest. It led to the amazing judicial innovation of strict liability.' 7 Commonwealth lawyers had been taught Lord Atkin's aphorism
that the common law was not beyond childbearing.8 8 Strict liability,
however, seemed a miracle birth incompatible with the well-accepted
accretion of law that in formalism can lead an innovative judge to leap
to a creative stroke.
The substantive nature of judicial decision making also is witnessed starkly in the event of empowering private law to perform public
law functions. Reflecting distrust of other branches of governments, the
courts have developed doctrines that promote public ends by fomenting
private litigation.8 9 They have encouraged individual litigation by private attorneys general when public institutions have been perceived as
incapable of responding to felt societal needs.9 0 Thus by effectively
swelling the contingency fee rewards of attorneys, punitive damages
have been expanded to situations unimaginable under English or Commonwealth law.9 1 In this endeavor the American courts have been encouraged by legislation that utilizes private litigation to promote public
policy ends. Antitrust litigation is the well-known example in which
treble damages may be awarded. This willingness to use the courts can
have adverse repercussions when common-law ideas are upset. By allowing for treble damages and attorney fee awards, congressional enactment of civil RICO has turned on its head carefully crafted judicial
doctrines in negligence and deceit.2
87. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
88. See Donogue v. Stevenson, [1932] App. Cas. 562.
89. See Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: Fhe Dilemma of Mass
Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845, 883-906 (1987); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection ihi Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984). This development has not escaped criticism. See Weinrib, The InsuranceJustification and Private Law, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985).
90. See Garth, Nagel & Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives From An Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL, L. REV. 353 (1988).
91. See Lamb v. Cotogno, 61 A.L.J.R. 549 (1987); Chapman & Trebilcock, Punitive Damages:
Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REv. 741 (1989); Marcus, Juries Rule Against
'Tort Reform' with Huge Awards, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1990, at A31, col. 3 (reporting that juries in
the United States gave out more than $475 millions in damages to individuals in the ten largest
jury awards in 1989, ranging from $25 million to $75 million); infra note 162.
92. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir.
1986).
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In liability for personal injuries the American courts moved boldly
to base liability directly on second-level substantive reasons. The
favoured approach evaluated a number of factors in a rough balance.
Important considerations were the extent to which liability would result
in loss distribution and compensate victims of accidents.9 These factors
imported a consideration of the presence of insurance. So it seemed
that insurance dictated legal doctrine instead of tracking it. English law
forbade reference to insurance for fear that it could result in liability's
subordination to insurance 4 Instrumentalism dominated judicial
thinking. Corrective justice notions were eschewed. 5
Sociologists have talked of democratic distemper. 6 This phrase describes the disjunction between popular demand and institutional capacities. Democratic distemper erodes confidence in political
institutions. The instrumental approach with its direct appeal to substantive reasons has led in the United States to a judicial distemper.
Like democratic distemper, judicial distemper consists of overloaded institutions-the courts-unable to carry through the mission assigned to
them. In the case of American courts their sally forth into liability for
personal injuries was prompted, as the Atiyah and Summers thesis
would suggest, by the fecklessness of other governmental institutions.
Not surprisingly, we often may see the courts faced with what they consider desirable social policy initiating reform because of the failure of
97
coordinate branches of government.
Activism necessarily dispensed with rules and obliged the courts to
engage in decision making that involved complex "polycentric" issues
well beyond the ordinary ken of judicial method.9 8 For example, courts
in cases of defective designs causing physical injury passed on issues
that would condemn entire product lines.9 9 In deciding this liability the
93. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38
(1973), cited with approval in Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985)
and Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983); see
also J.

FLEMING,

THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 188 (1988) (discussing the rise in the use of individ-

ualized factors).
94. See Davie v. New Merton Mills (1959] App. Cal. 604, 627 (Simonds, L.); see also Caltex
Oil v. "Willemstead" Australia, 136 C.L.R. 529 (1976) (Stephen, J.).
95.

See Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681

(1985).
96.

Huntington, The Democratic Distemper, 16 PUB. INTEREST 9-38 (1975).

97. The two famous reforming cases are Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561,
70 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1968) (occupiers' liability), and Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (applying comparative negligence principles).
98. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
99. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983) (holding defendant liable for
injuries arising out of use of an above-ground swimming pool and stating that for the issue to go to
jury it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the existence of a safer design but that the risks
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court directly addressed the issue of the social utility of certain kinds of
products. For example, in Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp.100
the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a defendant in an asbestos
liability case could be liable even though it had no means of knowing
that the product was dangerous at the time the plaintiff sustained the
injury.
Rules that appeared to frustrate the goal of compensation and enterprise liability were cast aside. The adoption of the market share rule
by some jurisdictions in drug liability cases is a pertinent example. Res
ipsa loquitur frequently had been utilized to overcome gaps in evidence
that would prevent recovery. The English courts use res ipsa in this
way but not as overtly as the American courts.' 0'
The market share cases arose out of the use of diethylstilbesterol
(DES).'0 2 The drug, manufactured almost exclusively by about ten
pharmaceutical companies, was prescribed to prevent complications
during pregnancy. Epidemiological studies later discovered that the
daughters of women who ingested the drug had an enhanced chance of
contracting cancer of the cervix.
Traditional methods of proof posed an impossible barrier to recovery. These traditional methods required the plaintiff to prove on the
balance of probabilities that her mother ingested the DES manufactured by a particular drug company; such a showing was infeasible. The
California Supreme Court accepted an academic suggestion that the dilemma could be overcome by according liability to the manufacturers in
proportion to the share of the market they held at the time of ingestion.'0° Any one manufacturer could escape liability by proving that its
product was not distributed to the plaintiff and, therefore, could not
have been ingested. 04 The New York Court of Appeals recently announced the apotheosis of this approach when it ruled that the manufacturers should be liable on the basis of their share of the national
market, regardless of proof by any individual company that its drug was
not distributed in the jurisdiction.'0 5 That liability ought to accord with
outweighed the utility of the product).
100. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
101. Atiyah, Res Ipsa Loquitur in England and Australia, 35 MOD. L. REv. 337 (1972); cf.
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), in which the court was prepared to alter the
usual burden of proof in causation to overcome barriers to liability.
102. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 58, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Smith v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 173 I1. App. 3d 1, 527 N.E.2d 333 (1988).
103. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980)
(relying on Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
963 (1978)).
104. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
105. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1420

[Vol. 43:1401

the risk of harm created by the manufacture and distribution of a product was a logical implication of the basis of these DES cases.' 08
Even as some courts were extending liability by overturning tradi1 a reversal was underway that questions
tional common-law doctrines, 07
the extent to which the courts have ventured. The Beshada case imposing absolute liability remains isolated. 08 The California Supreme Court
in Brown v. Superior Court,"9 a DES case, discussed in substantive
terms the burdens on the production and introduction of drugs imposed
by strict liability. The court hence ameliorated the rules and reintroduced a negligence framework. 1 0 In terms of another product, strict liability with respect to vaccines resulted in undesirable threat of liability.
Congress consequently enacted legislation granting compensation as a
quid pro quo for an immunity of liability for suppliers of vaccines.,"
Recall that insurance was viewed instrumentally as the vehicle by
which compensation could be delivered. Ironically, this institution demonstrates the limits of liability. In recent years claim frequency, severity
in products liability, and medical malpractice in particular have caused
a crisis, as insurance rates have exploded or insurance has become
unavailable." 2
The reasons for the insurance crisis are various. The debate about
the crisis is not clarified by the heavily tendentious rhetoric that accompanies it. A major reason for the crisis, however, is the rapid replacement of first party insurance by third party insurance under the
influence of expansive liability rules. Insurance has been viewed as a
loss spreading rather than risk reducing device." 3 Noble purposes of
compensation lie at the root of the expansion that perversely disadvantages that class of consumers which can afford least the flat rate of in106.

See Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA.

L. REV. 713 (1982); see also Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474
(1983) (discussing probalistic causation and English rejection of the idea); Stapleton, The Gist of
Negligence, 104 LAW Q. REV. 213 (1988).
107. Another example is successor liability. See Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d
581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of
Successor CorporationLiability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1555 (1984).

108. See FORM

AND SUBSTANCE,

supra note 1, at 49; see also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J.

169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
109. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
110. Id. at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
111. Clayton, Vaccine Liability (forthcoming in J. PEDIATRICS).
112. See P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Priest,
The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987) [hereinafter Priest,
CurrentInsurance Crisis];Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, Puzzles].
113. See Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1023 (1989);
Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 112.
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surance notionally levied against products. 114 This process encumbers
the precise segmentation of risks, hence diminishing the availability of
insurance.
Modern technologies have reduced the everyday hazards that once
afflicted everyday life. That very promise, however, has created a consciousness of risk derived from inflated expectations about technology
and enhanced loss should the promised good life be shortened. 11 5 In the
United States the courts have responded by creating a framework for
mass tort suits." 6 The magnitude of the litigation may require that
judges become managers of litigation whose function is to create conditions for settlement rather than adjudication. '
In the Agent Orange mass tort litigation Judge Jack B. Weinstein
departed from the scrupulously independent role of judges under the
adversarial system to cajole the parties to settle the controversial case, a
settlement he saw as important to rectify the wrongs of the Vietnam
War.' 8 Proof of causation was a major stumbling block to the plaintiff
veterans' action, but Judge Weinstein swept this impediment aside. 1i 9
In so doing the court can be seen as involving itself directly in secondlevel substantive matters that go beyond that set of policies usually
classified as legal.
Accordingly, we can see the judicial distemper. One can sympathize
with Judge Weinstein that other branches of government were feckless
when faced with the demands of the Vietnam veterans. Perhaps"the
courts are attempting to overcome democratic distemper by lending
their services. The very process, however, diminishes the courts and
leaves them open to two lines of attack.
First, courts have drawn criticism in the torts area for engaging in
the political act of redistributing wealth. Although the New Deal and
the Great Society also marked periods of wealth redistribution, judicially induced wealth redistribution is more devious because it is off114.

Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 112.
See generally M. DOUGLAS & A. WILAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Risk: Social and Legal Aspects of Risk
and Risk Related Behavior, 11 LAW & POL'Y (July 1989) (special issue on risk). The study of
choice in the presence of risk and uncertainty has reached some maturity, displacing the simple
assumption of rational choice employed by economics. See D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC, A. TVERKY,

115.

JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS & BIASES (1982); DECISION MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NOR-

MATIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS (D. Bell, H. Raiffa & A. Tversky eds. 1988).
116. Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "PublicLaw" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1989).
117. See P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986);
McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
440 (1986).
118. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
119. Id. at 829.
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budget. Tort law currently is seen as effectuating the disadvantageous
reallocation of resources from the economically active to the economically passive.
Second, critical legal scholars attack the courts for not drawing
their principles from a legal domain but from a domain of public policy
generally. Accordingly, these theorists perceive the law to be simply a
form of politics. Rules, they argue, originate from this wide domain and
certainly not as positivists would contend from a restricted domain established by a general rule of recognition. 120 The described distemper
allows these critics to point to judicial behavior as a basis for their
thesis.
Faith in coordinate branches of government permits the courts to
maintain a greater formality in England and the Commonwealth. Australian Vietnam veterans, for example, also claimed that they suffered
health problems as a result of exposure to Agent Orange. Some Australian veterans joined the American class action. 121 Within Australia an
inquiry-a Royal Commission-was established to investigate the
claims and report on actions that should be taken.'2 2 The Royal Commission determined that no causal link was established between Agent
Orange and the health problems of the victims.'2 3 The debate thereafter
was clearly a political one conducted before political institutions. The
standing and integrity of the courts were not at issue.
It is true that Parliament has not always been responsive to necessary changes in the law. With the heavy business of government, law
reform easily can be shunted to the back of the queue. Partly to overcome this tendency, England and the many Commonwealth countries
created law reform commissions that usually take references from the
government and report on the need and shape of law reform
mea25
24
institution.'
another
upon
rest
may
then
courts
The
sures.1
In America we are close to the cusp of change. It is therefore not
easy to predict confidently that formalism will be taken seriously
again.' 2 6 I rest, however, on some signs. The first indication is the pre120.

121.
122.

See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
See P. SCHUCK, supra note 117.

(1961).

ROYAL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE USE AND EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS ON

1985).
123. Id. VOL. 8, at XV-16.
124. See M. KIRBY, REFORM THE LAW 32-39 (1983); see also J. FARRAR, LAW

AUSTRALIAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM (July

REFORM AND THE

(1974); THE LAW COMMISSION AND LAW REFORM (G. Zellick ed. 1988).
125. In the United Kingdom the English and Scottish Law Commissions have been established. In Australia a federal commission, the Australian Law Reform Commission, reports on matters referred to it by the federal government. The Australian states have established similar
institutions. In Canada a parallel arrangement prevails. In New Zealand Parliament created the
New Zealand Law Reform Commission. See supra note 124.
126. See Shauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
LAW COMMISSION

1990]

BOOK REVIEW

1423

sent distemper affecting American law. The second is the accumulating
writing that urges an intelligent embrace of rules and formalism." 7
With this movement positivism, which was viewed as an English legal
philosophy,1 2 may gain adherents on this side of the Atlantic. The positivist theory will prove an anchor for courts reasserting a reliance on
rules to overcome judicial distemper.
As much as some commentators would advocate the change, it is
quixotic to believe that formalism will usurp substantive reasoning. A
change of attitude, however, may be taking place. Justice Scalia has
written about the "Rule of Law" being the "law of rules."' 2 9 He criticizes substantive factor balancing that is at the heart of tort law's
march to wider liability. 130
In the area of statutory interpretation American courts have been
at the substantive end of the spectrum.' 31 An open-ended use of legislative history as an aid to interpretation has effectuated this posture.
Conversely, the formalistic English view firmly restricts interpretation
to its literal meaning unless ambiguity appears. If there should be ambiguity the canons of interpretation can be employed, but this construal
may not go to Parliamentary debates, which are the equivalent of legislative history. To be sure, the technical precision of English and Com32
monwealth statutes supports this approach.
Sentiment can be detected for moving to a rule that relies more
heavily upon the literal meaning of the statute.'3 3 This movement is
influenced by the judicial distemper described. It places upon other
branches of government a responsibility for the way the law operates in
127. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 386 n.199
(1989); see also Schauer, supra note 126. Schauer stated: "I do want to urge a rethinking of the
contemporary aversion to formalism. For even if what can be said for formalism is not in the end
persuasive, the issues should be before us for inspection, rather than blocked by a discourse of
epithets." Id. at 511. Also militating in favor of such rules is writing that would improve communication between the branches of government. See Kastenmeier & Remington, A Judicious Legislator's Lexicon to the FederalJudiciary,in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY
54-89 (R. Katzmann ed. 1988).
128. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1.
129. See Scalia, supra note 55, at 1175.
130. Id. at 1186.
131. See FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1. Lord Eldon stated:
I cannot agree that the doctrines of this Court are to be changed with every succeeding judge.
Nothing would inflict greater plain, in quitting this place, than the recollection that I had
done any thing to justify the reproach that the equity of this Court varies like the Chancellor's foot.
Gee v. Pritchard, 36 E.R. 670, 674 (1818).
132. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2664 (1989); see also Eskridge &
Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (stating that
"[fi]n the last decade, statutory interpretation has reemerged as an important topic of academic
theory and discussion").
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society. 34 In so doing it restricts the domain of second-level substantive
reasons that can be used overtly or surreptitiously to arrive at favoured

results.
A harbinger is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the civil
RICO legislation. Some circuit courts of appeal attempted to import
glosses on the statute that would restrict the application of this draconian measure. The Supreme Court in two important decisions has rejected such a limiting importation.13 5 The literal words of the provision
were taken to provide a very wide remedy, and the Supreme Court invited Congress to examine the application of the law in this light.'
This invitation signals a desire by the Supreme Court to limit its role
and to force other governmental branches to live up to their responsibilities in forming law. Formalism in the courts may improve the performance of coordinate organs of government by proclaiming the courts'
bounded wisdom and abilities.
The foregoing represents a departure for those courts accustomed
to taking up the cudgel on the assumption of the fecklessness of other
governmental organs. Given, however, present day concerns about the
overloading of courts and the deprecations of academic critics, any distrust must perforce give way to trust.1 3 7 It may point to the substantive
role as being extremely arrogant.
134. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). This movement perhaps is exemplified best in the creation of implied rights of action under statutes. The courts have engaged in
the singularly vacuous task of devining the "intent" of Congress to create a private right of action.
This empty casting about has led Justice Antonin Scalia to propose a "flat" rule that "federal
private rights of action will not be implied." Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring). Some state courts freed from the Erie doctrine have drawn a conclusion
more in sympathy with the substantive tradition of American law that direct policy notions should
determine the issue of whether an action may be implied. See Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588
P.2d 1105 (1978); Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 183, 214-15 (1989) (arguing for more reliance on the constitutional text and resistance to ready overruling of constitutional cases in order to reinvigorate the
legislature's role in the amendment process).
135. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
136.

See generally Reforming RICO: If, Why, and How?, 43

VAND.

L. REV. 621 (1990).

137. A positive sign is that the process of institutional decision making is now the subject of
serious academic scholarship. See G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES (1985) (discussing the public choice theory). The decision making of courts has not escaped analysis. See
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802 (1982) (applying Arrow's indeterminacy theorem to decision making of the Supreme Court). This analysis should give courts a
better understanding of institutional decision making, both its own and that of others that it has
viewed with suspicion.
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STORMING FORMALISM'S FORTRESS

Let me describe a prime example of formalistic reasoning that contrasts markedly with the prevailing American style. This example deals
with the running of the limitation period, a rule of high mandatory formality as classified by Professors Atiyah and Summers. In Pirelli Gens the House of Lords
eral Cable Works Ltd. v. Oscar Faber & Partners""
addressed an engineering firm's liability for its negligent advice in the
construction of a chimney. The refractory inner lining was made partly
of a substance unsuitable for the purpose. Cracks developed requiring
its demolition and replacement. The defendant pleaded that the action
was statute-barred because the damage appeared more than six years
before the plaintiff commenced the action.'39 The cracks at the time
they first appeared were not reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff contended that the cause of action accrued at the time
when the damage became reasonably discoverable. 40
The House of Lords in a decision ten years prior decided that a
cause of action accrued even though the plaintiff could not have discovered the injury and thus could not have commenced an action. 141 Accordingly, the plaintiff who suffered from a progressive lung disease was
barred from recovery when the disease finally manifested itself. The
House of Lords saw the injustice in this result yet formalism ruled the
day. 42 For the House of Lords, the legislature,
not the court, was the
43
proper body to rectify this injustice.

Parliament concurred, and addressed this injustice by extending
the time limit for raising personal injury actions for damages when material facts were outside the plaintiff's knowledge.14 4 This legislative action, however, proved deficient for the Pirelli plaintiff. In Pirelli the
138. [1983] 2 App. Cas. 1.
139. Id. at 3.
140. Id.
141. Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Sons Ltd., [1963] App. Cas. 758.
142. Id. at 772.
143. Note the words of Lord Reid:
It appears to me to be unreasonable and unjustifiable in principle that a cause of action
should be held to accrue before it is possible to discover any injury and, therefore, before it is
possible to raise any action. If this were a matter governed by the common law I would hold
that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until either the injured person has
discovered the injury or it would be possible for him to discover it if he took such steps as
were reasonable in the circumstances. The common law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result, nor ought existing authorities to be read so literally as to produce such a
result in circumstances never contemplated when they were decided. But the present question
depends on statute, the Limitation Act, 1939, and section 26 of that Act appears to me to

make it impossible to reach the result which I have indicated.
144.

Limitation Act, 1963, ch. 47.
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House of Lords interpreted the amendment's restricted reach provision
to mean that "Parliament deliberately left the law unchanged so far as
actions for damages of other sorts was concerned."145
Their Lordships concluded that because the damage arose at the
time that the undiscoverable cracks appeared the plaintiff was unable
to mount an otherwise good cause of action. 4" The result may be "unreasonable
and contrary to principle" but "only Parliament can alter
147
it.'

Lord Scarman, a former Chairman of the English Law Commis-

sion, announced that the "true way forward is not by departure from
precedent but by amending legislation" and expressed hope that this
step would follow by the Lord
Chancellor's referral of the problem to
' 48
"his law reform committee.'

The House of Lords did not lack an appreciation of the substantive
issues. Mandatory formality, however, had benefits in shifting the formulation of policy from the confines of a particular dispute to another
institution that gives the issue a wider range of review. 149 This shift
15 0
requires a judicial faith in those other institutions.

To many Americans accustomed to reading tort decisions the reasoning in Pirelli seems passing strange. American courts recognize, as
did the House of Lords, the harshness of the limitation rule. That recognition, however, was but the starting point for the judicial creation of
the "discovery doctrine.'

5'

Formality gives way to the purposes of tort

law.
Parliaments have not always been responsive to their court's supplications. This lack of response has prompted the creation of law re145. Pirelli Gen. Cable Works Ltd., [1983] 2 App. Cas. at 14.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles), [1976] App. Cas. 443, 480 (Lord Simon).
150. See M. KIRBY, supra note 124, at 39. Mr. Justice Michael Kirby specifically maintains:
[There] are very powerful reasons why the Court should be reluctant to engage in [moulding
the common law to meet new conditions and circumstances]. The Court is neither a legislature nor a law reform agency. Its responsibility is to decide cases by applying the law to the
facts as found. The Court's facilities, techniques and procedures are adapted to that responsibility; they are not adapted to legislative functions or to law reform activities. The Court does
not and cannot carry out investigations or inquiries with a view to ascertaining whether particular common law rules are working well, whether they are adjusted to the needs of the
community, and whether they command popular assent. Nor can the Court call for and examine submissions from groups and individuals who may be vitally interested in the making
of changes to the law. In short, the Court cannot, and does not, engage in the wide-ranging
inquiries and assessments that are made by governments and law reform agencies as a desirable, if not essential, preliminary to the enactment of legislation by an elected legislature.
These considerations must deter a Court from departing too readily from a settled rule of the
common law and by replacing it with a new rule.
151. Id. For typical reasoning, see Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974).
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form commissions that have the time and resources to investigate and
gather comparative law, weigh competing views, and report to Parliament on appropriate reform measures. 152
Reliance on either standing law reform committees or ad hoc commissions obviously has allowed English and Commonwealth courts to
do justice while adhering to formality. The courts certainly have developed new doctrines of tort law, but this development has been a careful
process. 15s The major thrust of American tort law under the banner of
enterprise liability did not resonate in the English or Commonwealth
courts. The demands for wider compensation instead found their way to
various commissions that recommended reform. 4 The apotheosis occurred in New Zealand when a report was accepted that abolished the
right at common law to recover damages for personal injuries. 155 In lieu
of the right at common law, injured persons in New Zealand are enti56
tled to claim compensation on a preset scale, from a statutory body.
In the issue of strict liability for defective products the English,
all have relied upon enquiries recomCanadians, and Australians
57
mending legislation.1
The hand of Bentham can be seen. 55 The legislative process is accepted as the rational and democratically appropriate means by which
society ought to be ordered. 59 As Professors Atiyah and Summers
rightly point out, societal resources are devoted to this endeavor. The
public service is highly professional and career oriented. The drafting of
statutes and regulations takes place with a consistency and precision
152. M. KIRBY, supra note 124, at 6.
153. The English and Australian courts, without fear of jury sympathies, have extended liability for negligent infliction of distress more broadly than many American jurisdictions, but the
limits are carefully drawn. See McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 410; Jaensch v. Coffey,
155 C.L.R. 549 (1984).
154.
INJURY,

See

ROYAL COMMISSION, REPORT ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL

1978, CMND. No. 7054 [hereinafter CMND. No. 7054];

PORT ON COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION IN AUSTRALIA

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, RE-

(1974).

155. Cf. O'Connell & Partlett, An America's Cup for Tort Reform? Australia and America
Compared, 21 MICH. J.L. REF. 443 (1988).
156. See G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979). Geoffrey Palmer, formerly a professor of law at Iowa, is now
the New Zealand Prime Minister.
157. For Australian initiatives, see supra note 37. For United Kingdom recommendations,
see LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS, 1977, CMND. No. 6831 and
CMND. No. 7054, supra note 154, at 255-73.
158. He is, of course, a palpable presence and his stuffed body is brought out annually at
King's College, London School of Economics.
159. See JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE LAW (G. Keeton & G. Schwarzenberger eds. 1948); Craig,
Bentham, Public Law and Democracy, PUB. LAW 407 (1959) (Bentham's views about the inner
working of democracy); Partlett, From Red Lion Square to Skokie to the Fatal Share: Racial
Defamation and Freedom of Speech, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 431 (1989); POSTEMA, supra
note 55.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1428

[Vol. 43:1401

unusual in American statutes.16 0 Little basis is given for judges to attack other branches because of lack of competence.
Despite the foregoing, English and Commonwealth courts are likely
to turn to second-level substantive reasoning more often than they have
in.the past. These courts increasingly are being required to protect the
rights of the citizen against the other arms of government to which the
courts traditionally have deferred. Perforce they are obliged to
61
distrust.1
In these developments the Benthamite influence has waned. His
withering appraisal of such human rights as nonsense upon stilts is out
of kilter with sentiments in modern society that aim at the protection
of the individual.'6 2 The American experience becomes pertinent. The
lessons derived from the matching of the citizen against the state is no
better exemplified than in the American Constitution experience. 16 3 But
whether or not the substantive principles are grown in America the
courts necessarily will resort to substantive principles.
Outside constitutional or public law, English and Commonwealth
courts pay heed to American developments. Those courts, however, do
not always accept these developments.
American courts developed the informed consent doctrine in order
to protect the autonomy of patients in the face of medical decisions.
Medical practitioners have a duty of care to warn patients of the material risks associated with medical procedures.'6 4 Beginning with Reibl v.
Hughes,6 5 a Canadian case, the action was recognized as being
grounded upon that autonomy right. Australian and English cases followed.' 6 6 Elsewhere American developments in unconscionability in
contracts, 6 7 probalistic causation,6 6 liability in negligence for pure eco160. FORM AND SUBSTANCE, supra note 1; see also LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPT., REPORT ON THE
WORK AND ORGANISATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, CMND. No. 570 [hereinafter CMND. No.
570].
161. The adherence of the United Kingdom to the European Convention on Human Rights
imposes on the courts a reorientation toward human rights issues. See A.M. & S. Europe Ltd. v.
Commission of the European Communities, [1983] 3 W.L.R. 17.

162. See D.

LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE

712 (4th ed. 1979) (citing J. Bentham,

Anarchical Fallacies in HUMAN RIGHTS (A. Melden ed. 1970)).
163. See Mason, supra note 24, at 28 (noting a "movement away from formal, legalistic interpretations"); Wiehl, Constitution Anyone? A New Cottage Industry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at
B6, col. 3.
164. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
165. 114 D.L.R.3d 1 (1980).
166. See, e.g., Sidaway v. Board of Governors, [1985] App. Cas. 871; see also Partlett, Recent
Cases, 59 AUSTL. L.J. 341 (1985) (discussing Sidaway).

167.

D.

168.

See Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence: Part II, 104 L.Q. REv. 389 (1988).

GREIG

& J. DAVIS,

THE LAW OF CONTRACT

(1987).
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nomic losses'6 9 and for negligent misstatements,'17 0 and the liability of

lawyers for in-court activities' 7 ' have been examined carefully and accepted or discarded.
The ideas usually come packaged as cases. Although some Commonwealth courts have shown a greater propensity to cite academic articles, most articles find little audience before judges. English and
Commonwealth legal institutions are structured to limit access by
outside ideas. In England and most other important common-law jurisdictions, the bar is de jure or de facto separated from solicitors. Barristers are briefed by solicitors to represent the latter's clients in court.
Barristers also are asked to render advice on matters that involve complexities beyond the competence of solicitors. Barristers acquire an expertise in the workings of the courts. Many rules of etiquette are
designed to separate the bar from solicitors. Barristers share a closer
relationship with the bench than with solicitors. Barristers cannot form
partnerships and eschew trappings of commercialism. For court-related
work they cannot be sued in negligence. 7 2 They work together in chambers where cooperation and a clubby atmosphere prevails.
The bar has an intellectual tradition. One's standing in the ranks of
barristers turns on success in the ritualistic battles of the courtroom.
Abilities readily are apparent and saturnine attributes cannot easily be
hidden. Change, however, lurks in the corridors of the courts with the
prospect of profound changes in the structure of the legal profession
under the aegis of the Lord Chancellor's White Paper. Barristers' practice may be more akin to that of solicitors who, in turn, may forge multinational links.'7

It should be remembered that university-based legal education is a
relatively recent phenomenon. During the early decades of this century
many joined the London Bar with a classics background from Oxford or
Cambridge. 7 4 The law was to be learned on the job. With the exception
of Dalhousie, Canada had no separate university law schools until after
the Second World War. In comparison Australia's Sydney and Mel169. See Caltex Oil v. "Willemstead" Australia, 136 C.L.R. 529 (1976).
170. Hedley Byrne v. Heller, [1964] App. Cas. 465, 470 (citing with approval § 552 of the
Second Restatement of Torts).
171. Giannerelli v. Wraith, 62 A.L.J.R. 611 (1988) (distinguishing Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616
F.2d 924 (1980)).
172. Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 App. Cas. 191; Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell, [1980] App. Cas.
198.
173. See CMND. No. 570, supra note 160; Harper, Bye, Bye Barrister,A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at

58.
174. An outstanding example of one with a classics background is Lord Denning, long-time
Court of Appeal Lord Justice and Master of the Rolls, whose iconoclastic ways greatly influenced
the law.
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bourne Universities are quite aged. 175
*It followed that legal books and articles were written by barristers.
A reputation for intellectual rigor and assiduous legal analysis is regarded as a prerequisite for reaching the higher echelons of the bar (to
become a Queen's Counsel) and for elevation to the bench. This reputation is enhanced greatly by the publication of legal scholarship. English
and Commonwealth legal scholarship, however, naturally lacks the challenging theoretical edge of works produced by better academic writing.
Too often, the scholarly analysis of cases ends in words likely to stir the
American substantive blood: "[I]t is idle to dispute its merits, since it is
1 76
firmly entrenched.'
In contrast American writing of the highest caliber is academic and
bristles with challenging analysis. Even treatises compare, criticize, and
factor in the latest theoretical insights. 1 7 The dominant ethos is that
no legal principle is so sacrosanct that it should escape critical
appraisal.
Direct incorporation of substantive ideas is facilitated by a loosely
organized bar that has no internal intellectual tradition. Ideas must be
garnered externally. These ideas are a valuable commodity in law making. Attorney cost rules and the legitimacy of the contingency fee arrangements stimulate the production of innovative ideas. A novel cause
of action can be pressed when a payoff may be handsome. 78 In England
and the Commonwealth the injection of innovative ideas is discouraged
by several forces, including the separation of the bar, the English cost
rule, and the prohibition of the contingency fee. The sanction of an
award of costs may dissuade the active pursuit of novel causes of action.
It is not always a theory of cultural and social differences that explains
these matters. Prosaic reasons often may be usefully considered. Professors Atiyah and Summers tend toward grand schemes and perhaps give
short shrift to such prosaic factors.
The American institution of legal education and career patterns indirectly enhance the value of novel ideas. The writers of legal scholar175.

See R. DHAVAN, N. KIBBLE & W. TWINING, ACCESS TO LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL

85, 114 (1989) (discussing access to legal education and the legal profession in Australia and Canada).
PROFESSION

176.

R. MEAGHER, W. GUMMOW & J. LEHANE, EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 477 (1975).

While the volume generally is an excellent analysis of this complex and often arcane law; the
authors disincline to engage in "academic" debate. In discussing the seminal (as they say, the fons
et origo) English decision of Lumley v. Wagner, [1852] All E.R. Rep. 368, they concede that the
case has been subject to extensive academic criticism, but refuse to question the law's validity. Id.
177. See F. HARPER, E. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS (1986); see also Atiyah, American Tort Law in Crisis, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1987).
178. See Pritchard, A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee,
and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451 (1988).
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ship espouse it in their law school classes. The Socratic or casebook
method usually devolves quickly to policy analysis as students are
asked to defend old rules against new rules. The substantive debate is
framed by the legal issues. Accordingly, in a torts course students explore the moral and ethical foundations of the law.
The best and brightest of students often take up judicial clerkships
after graduation. The glittering prize is a United States Supreme Court
clerkship. The "substantive" or policy oriented law school experience is
taken across into the respective court. Law clerks are active in research
and drafting possible analyses for the judges.
Judges are recruited from a wider segment of the profession. Some
may be able politicians and successful attorneys without the experience
that makes one comfortable on the bench. Clerks may possess power
because of their familiarity with the ideas in the law. Judges bring more
pragmatic perspectives. Furthermore, it is far more common in America
for judges to be selected from the ranks of legal academia. In these instances judges inject ideas directly into the judicial decision making
process.
The extent to which English and Commonwealth courts grow more
receptive to American case law will determine the extent to which they
absorb substantive American ideas. In the areas of public law dealing
with the citizens and the state, those substantive ideas, for want of formal alternatives and academic competitors, are likely to find a ready
audience. The changing structure of the profession will prove more welcoming to ideas not possessing the old pedigree. Clearly it would be
foolish to proclaim the death of formalism in England and the Commonwealth. My more modest point is that substantive reasoning will
become more important. The source of that inspiration, especially for
the Commonwealth, is likely to be American law. Thus the paradigm
proposed by Professors Atiyah and Summers is likely to be contradicted by numerous counter examples.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This book is a rich quarry. In its 432 pages the authors have
packed a wealth of theory and practical example. This tight packing,
however, may be a drawback.
Form and Substance will be used by two kinds of persons. First,
there is the dabbler; the person who starts at the index for the immediate purposes of a particular point. The dabbler will be rewarded but is
likely to misunderstand. The dabbler will not invest the effort to come
to grips with the theoretical premises around which the details are
gathered. The second type is the reader. The book will be digested thoroughly by some, mainly by comparativists and theoreticians. The re-
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wards are great, but so is the effort at persisting in the task. It is not
that the book lacks grace. It is generally happily written, although its
authors' different styles are sometimes too evident. Its greatest flaw is a
dabbler's delight; its detail obliterates the authors' theme. Except for
my comments about Commonwealth law, the arguments that I suggest
in this Review are present in the book. But they are hidden as flowers
in the Amazon forest. Some pruning back of foliage would have displayed better the blossoms.
Form and Substance will become a classic in Anglo-American law.
Ironically, however, it will become a classic not so much because of its
incisive analysis but because it will spawn a renewed scholarship. This
scholarship will owe a great debt to the prodigious effort of Professors
Atiyah and Summers. Explorers will uncover the flowers for others to
admire. The authors have given us the benefit of a lifetime of distinguished scholarship. Professor Atiyah recently retired from the Chair of
English law at Oxford. This work is a singular achievement at the end
of his prolific academic career. I suspect, however, he will not reduce his
flow of writing just because he formally stepped down.
It is to be hoped that this joint work may be a model for future
collaboration between distinguished English, Commonwealth, and
American lawyers. Works of this kind require a familiarity with two
enormous legal systems-the American and the Anglo-Commonwealth.
This task becomes more difficult as the Commonwealth law fractures,
but the rewards of bringing to bear various legal experiences are great.
If I am right about our judicial distemper, we may acutely see solutions and we may defend more forcefully the law as an autonomous discipline.. If I am right that American law will grow better in importance
for changing societies in England and the Commonwealth, the nature of
that law can be understood better for successful transplantation.

